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Abstract
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private incentives of a price-setting agent (whom we refer to as a specialist). The specialist has private
information that may be (partially) revealed through his choice of a pricing rule. We define an equilibrium as a
pricing rule and a response to that rule by a representative trader that maximizes the expected utilities of the
specialist and the trader, conditional on each having rational expectations. By analyzing the existence and
nature of this equilibrium, we attempt to develop further insights into the behavior of markets with
incomplete information.
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 The Information Content of Specialist Pricing
 John P. Gould
 University of' Chicago
 Robert E. Verrecchia
 University of Pennsylvania
 This paper examines a process by which information-revealing
 prices are determined by considering the private incentives of a
 price-setting agent (whom we refer to as a specialist). The specialist
 has private information that may be (partially) revealed through his
 choice of a pricing rule. We define an equilibrium as a pricing rule
 and a response to that rule by a representative trader that maximizes
 the expected utilities of the specialist and the trader, conditional on
 each having rational expectations. By analyzing the existence and
 nature of this equilibrium, we attempt to develop further insights
 into the behavior of markets with incomplete information.
 I. Introduction
 The purpose of this paper is to deal simultaneously with two prob-
 lems the literature on finance and economics has tended to address
 separately. On the one hand, the literature has considered the prob-
 lem of determining the information content of prices without detailed
 modeling of the process by which prices are formed. On the other
 An earlier draft of this paper was titled "The Specialist as Economic Agent." We
 greatly benefited from having had the opportunity to present earlier drafts of this
 paper at workshops sponsored by the University of British Columbia, UCLA, Univer-
 sity of Chicago, Cornell, University of Houston, Purdue, Stanford, and University of
 Toronto. We would particularly like to acknowledge the remarks and advice of Douglas
 Diamond, Gerald Feltham, Mark Grinblatt, Sanford Grossman, Edward Lazear, Dale
 Morse, James Patell, Jose Scheinkman, Myron Scholes, and Mark Wolfson.
 Iournal (fJ Politlcal EconomyT, 1985, vol. 93, no. 1]
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 hand, the literature has dealt with the process of price determination
 without paying much attention to the mechanism by which any infor-
 mation contained in prices satisfies a rational expectations equilib-
 rium.1 By considering these two problems jointly, we hope to obtain
 further insights into how speculative markets work in a world of
 incomplete information.
 Our approach is to analyze a model in which a specialist explicitly
 considers both the information content and the trading implications
 of the price he sets. Specifically, we consider a model of a market in
 which a specialist and a representative trader exchange a riskless
 numeraire good for a risky asset. Before trading occurs, both the
 specialist and trader are endowed with private information and assets.
 After trade occurs, the random return on the risky asset is realized,
 and the trader and specialist consume the liquidation value of the
 final portfolio they own. Trade itself is a two-step process. In step one,
 the specialist sets a price.2 In step two, the trader chooses the quantity
 he wishes to buy or sell at that price. Note that we restrict the analysis
 to a single-price case (e.g., multipart pricing or bid-ask spread pricing
 are not considered).
 The specialist's selection of a price to maximize his expected sur-
 plus provides a rationale, or process, by which prices are formed. The
 specialist is not allowed to make the price contingent on the quantity
 purchased. Thus, in the second step in the trading process, the trader
 behaves as a pure price taker. In this way, we are able to link private
 incentives to set prices, through the introduction of the specialist, with
 the competitive behavior of traders exhibited in markets in which
 prices are set by a Walrasian auctioneer.
 ' No attempt is made here to provide a comprehensive listing of all the articles that
 have dealt with these topics. A partial listing of some of the relevant papers includes
 Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975), Garman (1976), Grossman (1976, 1978), Jaffe and
 Winkler (1976), Bradfield and Zabel (1979), Wilson (1979), Zabel (1979), Gould (1980),
 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980, 1982), Verrecchia (1980, 1982), Diamond
 and Verrecchia (1981), Milgrom (1981), Grinblatt and Ross (1982), and Milgrom and
 Weber (1982).
 2 In practice, a specialist can play both an active role and a passive role in price
 determination. In his passive role, the specialist maintains a "book" of limit orders and
 fills market orders from this book at the price that is best from the viewpoint of the
 customer placing the market order. In his passive role, the specialist is purely a broker
 who is compensated by brokerage fees. In the active role, the specialist actually takes a
 market position himself. Our analysis considers only the active role of the specialist; we
 do not analyze the nature or behavior of limit orders. Moreover, we do not allow the
 specialist to limit his exposure-once he sets price he must balance the market by
 adjusting his own portfolio to cover any difference between the demand and supply
 quantities offered by traders. We make these abstractions to avoid unnecessary compli-
 cations, not because we think that further extensions of the model would be uninter-
 esting.
 3 We assume that the specialist can issue shares in either the risky or riskless asset, if
 necessary, to cover any excess or negative demand.
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 If both the specialist and the trader had the same information, our
 problem would be similar to the standard textbook model of monop-
 oly." This is not the case, however, when the specialist has private
 information, because then the trader's demand function depends on
 what he thinks the specialist uses to set prices. This means that some
 care needs to be taken in defining an equilibrium.
 The price rule the specialist uses in setting a price potentially re-
 veals his private information to the trader. The specialist selects a
 price to maximize his expected utility in anticipation of the trader's
 demand at that price, while carefully weighing the fact that the trad-
 er's demand is affected by what he learns from the price announce-
 ment. The trader, for his part, infers information on the basis of a
 conjecture about the price rule used by the specialist, which influences
 the trader's demand. Therefore, in our model, we define an equilib-
 rium as a price rule and a response to that rule that maximizes the
 respective expected utilities of the specialist and trader conditional on
 each having rational expectations.
 Because price reveals information, we assume that the specialist can
 disguise, or mask, whatever rate he selects for exchanging risky versus
 risk-free assets. The specialist does this by adding a noise term to the
 exchange rate he selects in determining the price he quotes the
 trader.5 Although we initially assume that the level of noise is an
 exogenously specified parameter, in Section IV we discuss what par-
 ticular level of noise is optimal from the specialist's perspective.
 A brief outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II we formally
 define an equilibrium to the problem outlined above. As a way of
 illustrating the nature of this equilibrium, in Section III we introduce
 specific assumptions that allow closed-form expressions. In Section
 IV, we examine the role of the level of noise in influencing the special-
 ist's surplus and, in Section V, we consider the realism of our model in
 comparison with how a specialist is thought to operate. In the final
 section, we summarize our discussion.
 II. Definition of an Equilibrium
 In this section we define an equilibrium to a market for risky assets
 whose price is set by a maximizing monopolist. We assume that the
 4 The only difference, which is inconsequential, is that the quantity demanded may
 be negative-i.e., the trader may choose to sell rather than buy the risky asset.
 5This raises an important, but subtle, modeling issue: if the trader acts as if the price
 quotation garbles the information the specialist has, then the specialist may either not
 garble the price or garble it in a way other than the trader is assuming. To avoid this
 inconsistency, we make one of two analytically equivalent assumptions: (1) there exists a
 recommitment mechanism that garbles the price, such as the static in the telephone
 line the specialist agrees to use in communicating the price to the trader, or (2) the
 parameters of the garbling distribution (the expression V in our model) are revealed to
 the trader along with the noisy price.
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 specialist is risk neutral: that is, he has a utility for consuming an
 amount w represented by S(w) = w. The numeraire in the market is
 the price of a bond known to return one unit of the consumption
 good in the final period. The liquidating dividend on the risky asset is
 unknown until the final period and is represented by a random vari-
 able is whose realization is denoted by u. (Henceforth, a tilde will be
 used to distinguish a random variable from its realization.) The trader
 is endowed with B, riskless assets and x, risky assets; the specialist's
 endowment is irrelevant (in this analysis) in the presence of his risk
 neutrality. The specialist and trader are also endowed with private
 information about the uncertain outcome ft. Specifically, the specialist
 observes y, and the trader observes 5,, where each of 5, and 5t com-
 municates the actual outcome ft = u perturbed by some noise.
 We assume that in quoting a price to the trader, the specialist can
 precommit to garbling whatever value he selects as the appropriate
 rate of exchange for risky versus risk-free assets. Let P(x,, yx) represent
 the value the specialist selects as the exchange rate as a function of the
 trader's endowment of the risky asset (which is common knowledge),
 x,, and the private information observed by the specialist, ys Let 8
 represent the garbling, or noise, that is added to PQ ). That is, the
 specialist selects P(x,, y,), but the price quoted to the trader is P(xt, yj +
 6. Finally, let R(xt, B,y, p) represent the trader's excess demand for
 the risky asset, as a function of his endowment of the risky and risk-
 free assets, x, and B, respectively, his private information, bt, and the
 price of the risky asset, p. This allows us to define expected utility
 functions y, and Yt. for the specialist and trader, respectively, by:
 -y[xt, Y,, pIR(-)] = E[(p + 8 - 0)R(xt, Bt, yt, p + 6)15, yj,
 y,[x,, B,, yt, p, rIP(-) + 8] =
 ElU[(ft - p)(r + xt) + pxt + B,]lP(xt,y,) + -p, t yt,
 where U(w) is the trader's utility for consuming an amount w. If, at p,
 the expression R(-) is positive, the specialist "covers" the trader by
 issuing shares against his own account of the risky asset sufficient to
 satisfy the excess demand; if the expression is negative, the specialist
 "eats" the excess supply by making it part of his personal portfolio.
 This allows us to define an equilibrium to a market in which the
 price is set by a maximizing monopolist with private information as a
 pair of functions P(-) and R(-) such that
 P(x,, ys) = argmax -yj[x,, Y., pIR(-)],
 R(x,, B,, y, p) = argmax y,[x,, B,, yt, p, rIP(-) + 6].
 Essentially, R(-) is the set of arguments for r that maximizes the trad-
 er's expected utility in response to any price p he is quoted, given his
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 conjecture about the price rule used by the specialist. P( ) is the set of
 arguments for p that represents the specialist's best response to the
 trader's anticipated demand, given the private information the spe-
 cialist observes. In this equilibrium, expectations are rational, or
 fulfilled, because the conditional expectation operators defining yS
 and -y are the correct ones based on the underlying joint distribution
 of ft, and b.
 III. An Illustration of an Equilibrium
 To illustrate the nature of an equilibrium to the model we propose,
 we introduce three assumptions that facilitate the analysis. First, we
 assume that the random vector (iu y5, %s b) has a four-variate normal
 distribution with the mean (ye, Yo, yes 0) and covariance matrix
 fu h- hill h- 0
 Y, h- h-1 + f-1 h- 1
 yeh- 1 h-1 + g1 0
 The expression h, which is the precision of the unconditional distribu-
 tion of ft, can be thought of informally as a measure of the amount of
 common knowledge about ft. The expressions f and g can be inter-
 preted as measures of the amount of private information held by the
 specialist and trader, respectively: for example, f = 0 implies that
 the specialist has no information andf f-x c implies that he knows the
 realization u of ft with certainty. The expression V is the level of noise,
 or garbling, the specialist precommits to including in any price the
 trader is quoted.
 Second, the trader has a (negative) exponential utility function with
 constant absolute risk tolerance of one: that is, he has a utility for
 consuming an amount w represented by U(w) = - exp( - w). This, in
 conjunction with all the assumptions taken together and especially
 normality, implies that the trader's excess demand for the risky asset,
 R( ), is given by
 R (x,, v, p) = varE[ftly=ytg P(-) + p] -P -
 R I1 ~p var[fiylt = yt, P(-) + = p]
 Note that for this case the trader's excess demand for the risky asset is
 independent of his endowment of the risk-free asset.6
 ' The discussion in this section is couched in terms of one trader facing the specialist.
 The results are easily generalized to many traders assuming that the traders' excess
 demand function is linear in price and all traders observe the same information. The
 model could be further generalized such that traders observe different information.
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 Finally, we assume that the trader always conjectures that the rule
 used by the specialist in selecting price has the special linear form P(x,,
 Ys) = ays + bx, + c, where a, b, and c are real-valued constants. Essen-
 tially, the effect of these three assumptions is to permit an explicit
 solution to the equilibrium concept we propose by preserving a cer-
 tain linearity already inherent in the problem.7 In restricting attention
 to linear objective functions, we are not modifying our definition of
 equilibrium, but instead are looking for equilibria of a particular
 kind. We leave as unresolved the question whether nonlinear-type
 assumptions will also yield explicit solutions.
 With regard to illustrating a solution to the special case we consider,
 our first result is to reduce the equilibrium concept to a more tractable
 form. Consider the specialist's choice of the parameters a, b, and c in
 determining an expression for P(xt, ys). Let A(a) be a quadratic func-
 tion of a of the form A(a) = a2(h + f + g) - af + Vf(h + g)
 LEMMA 1: The existence of an equilibrium is equivalent to the exis-
 tence of an a* that simultaneously satisfies
 [2a(h + f) - JIA(a) -f'(Vf + a2) 0 (1)
 and
 A(a) > 0. (2)
 PROOF: See Appendix.
 The intuition behind lemma 1 is that the existence of an equilib-
 rium breaks down to two requirements: equation (1) ensures that the
 specialist's choice of a* leads to a conjecture that is fulfilled on the part
 of the trader, while equation (2) ensures that the specialist's choice of
 a* maximizes his expected utility (i.e., his objective function is globally
 concave with respect to a). The additional parameters b* and c* can be
 determined by substituting the value for a* into the functions b(a) and
 c(a) given by:
 b(a) - c ~a) = y()(l -2 + fV
 2[a2(h + f + g) + /V(h + g)] - fa c(a) - yo(I - a). (3)
 It is now possible to establish the existence of a unique equilibrium
 when V> Of> 0, and g> 0.
 THEOREM 1: There exists a unique equilibrium.
 PROOF: First, observe that a* satisfies [2a(h + f) - f]A(a) -fgVf +
 a2) = 0 and A(a) > 0 if and only if it is a root to the third-order
 Specifically, we have already assumed that the specialist is risk neutral and that
 garbling requires adding a noise term to the specialist's selection of price.
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 polynomial [2a(h + f) - f]A(a) - f(Vf + a2) in the region V/2(h +
 f), x). Then, observe that this third-order polynomial is
 1. clearly negative at a = f/2(h + f);
 2. eventually positive as a becomes large, since the coefficient of a is
 positive; and
 3. convex in the region [f12(h + f), x).
 These three facts imply that the polynomial has a single (positive,
 real-valued) root in the region defined by [f/2(h + f), x). Therefore,
 there exists one, and only one, a* that both is a root to the polynomial
 expression and satisfies A(a) > 0. Q.E.D.
 Although the price the specialist quotes cannot be derived in a
 simple closed form, using lemma 1 straightforward expressions can
 be found for the three polar cases of V = 0, g = 0, orf = 0.8 The case
 V = 0 is equivalent to assuming that the price the specialist selects is
 never masked.
 COROLLARY 1: When V = 0, a (unique) equilibrium takes the form:
 h* f b* = -1 Ii To
 h + h + f + 2g' h + f_
 PROOF: Suppose V 0. This reduces the requirement for an equi-
 librium in lemma 1 to finding an a* such that
 [2a(h + f) -f]A(a) -f/a2 = O (4)
 and
 A(a) = a2(h + f + g) - af > 0. (5)
 It is a simple exercise to show that a (unique) a* that satisfies (4) and
 (5) is given by a* =fl(h + f). This is because (4) reduces to a quadratic
 function with two real-valued roots, only one of which (i.e., a fl[h +
 /1) implies A(a) > 0. Q.E.D.
 Corollary I implies that in the absence of noise, that is, V 0, the
 specialist has no truly private information, since the trader can make
 unambiguous inferences about y, = y. on the basis of P = P. Alterna-
 tively, a trader may have no private information whatsoever. This is
 equivalent to assuming g = 0. When the specialist has private infor-
 mation while the trader does not, an equilibrium does not exist unless
 noise passes beyond some threshold.
 COROLLARY 2: When g = 0, a (unique) equilibrium exists only if V >
 fl4h(h + f); in that event, it takes the form
 2( b -+ 2 [L h 4Vh(h + f)2 1 - 2(h + f)Y
 8 A closed-form solution can be found by solving the cubic equation implicit in the
 proof of theorem 1. However, this expression is not transparent.
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 PROOF: Suppose g = 0. This reduces the requirement for an equi-
 librium in lemma 1 to finding an a* such that
 [2a(h + f) + f] A(a) = 0, (6)
 and
 A(a) = a2(h + /) - Vfh - af > 0. (7)
 Here, a unique a* that satisfies (6) is given by a* = f/2(h + f). How-
 ever, at that value, A(a) is positive only if V > fl4h(h + f). Thus, there
 exists no equilibrium when 0 < V ? fl4h(h + f). Q.E.D.
 Corollary 2 has an immediate economic interpretation. Suppose
 that the trader conjectures that the price offered by the specialist
 contains information. If there is very little noise, that is, V ' fl4h(h +
 f), the trader puts much weight on what price he is quoted as a signal
 of the realization of the risky asset. For example, if a high price is
 quoted, the trader believes that the realization will be large and there-
 fore demands a good deal of the risky asset. Thus, independent of his
 private information, the specialist's incentive is to select a high ex-
 change rate, since if' he can sell even a little bit of' the risky asset at a
 very high price, the specialist makes a big profit. But if the specialist
 selects a high exchange rate independent of' what he knows, price can-
 not contain information, so the trader's conjecture is false. Suppose,
 on the other hand, that the trader conjectures that price contains no
 information (i.e., he ignores price as a source of information). Then
 the (expected-utility-maximizing) exchange rate the specialist selects
 will depend on his private information, so the trader's conjecture is
 false once again. In short, there is no conjecture the trader can make
 that is fulfilled until noise passes beyond some threshold, which les-
 sens the weight he puts on price as a source of information.
 Corollary 2 is interesting also because of the discontinuity it sug-
 gests. Provided that the trader has some private information, that is, g
 > 0, no matter how small, an equilibrium exists independent of V.
 (For example, as shown in corollary 1, it exists even at V = 0.) The
 intuition here is that whenever the trader has some independent
 source of information to substantiate claims by the specialist, implicit
 in the price the trader is quoted, the specialist is kept in check and the
 equilibrium is preserved.
 For completeness, we consider the case in which the specialist has
 no private information whatever, that is, f = 0. This is equivalent to
 requiring that a* = 0 in the expression for price, since price cannot
 depend on information the specialist does not have.
 COROLLARY 3: When f = 0, a (unique) equilibrium takes the form
 a* = 0, b = -[1/2(h + g)], c* = yo.
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 PROOF: Since the specialist has no private information, a* must be
 zero. When a* andf are zero, equations (1) and (2) are both implicitly
 satisfied (see the proof of lemma 1 in the App.). Substituting a* equal
 to zero into the expressions for b and c in (3) yields the result (factor-
 ing outf in the former case). Q.E.D.
 Corollary 3 is a straightforward monopoly problem since the spe-
 cialist is endowed with no private information. For example, here the
 trader ignores price as a source of information, and thus his demand
 depends only on what he observes privately, Yt = yt.
 IV. The Specialist's Surplus
 The specialist's surplus is defined as the difference between the spe-
 cialist's expected utility at an equilibrium and his expected utility at
 his autarky position.9 Because the specialist is risk neutral, we assume
 without loss of generality that the specialist's expected utility at his
 autarky position is zero. The purpose of this section is to explore how
 a specialist's surplus is affected by (1) the amount of the specialist's
 private information, as represented byf; (2) the amount of the trad-
 er's private information, as represented by g; and (3) the level of
 noise, as represented by V. The reason for examining this issue is that
 a specialist may be able to control or influence these parameters (espe-
 ciallyf and V); therefore, it is worth considering his incentives to do
 so. For example, a specialist may be able to control the amount of
 private information he acquires; or, if V is thought of informally as
 the level of static in the telephone line over which he communicates
 the price of a risky asset, the specialist may be able to set the level of
 static to suit his purposes. To address this question, we first need an
 expression for the specialist's surplus.
 THEOREM 2: The specialist's surplus is determined by substituting
 the a* that satisfies equations (1) and (2) in lemma 1 into the expres-
 sion
 (a2 + fV) [a2(h + f + g) + fV(h + g) - fa]
 t [2a2(h + f + g) + 2fV(h + g) - fa]2 |
 [a2(h-' +?-') - V][a2(h + f + g) + fV(h + g) -fa] h-
 a2 + fV
 PROOF: See Appendix.
 The usefulness of theorem 2 is limited because for the general case
 off, g, and V, each positive, the parameter a* cannot be expressed in a
 ') Other definitions of the specialist's surplus might be used depending on what one
 assumes about the specialist's alternatives. In this definition, we implicitly assume that
 the specialist's alternative is not to trade at all (autarky).
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 simple closed form. As a way of approaching the general case, we first
 consider, separately, the two polar cases in which (1) the specialist has
 no private information while the trader does (i.e.,f = 0, g > 0); and
 (2) the trader has no private information while the specialist does (i.e.,
 f > 0, g = 0). Here, simple closed-form expressions for a* can be
 derived (see corollaries 2 and 3 above). For each of these cases, a
 recurrent question is what level of noise V maximizes the specialist's
 surplus.
 The case where the specialist has no private information and the
 trader does (i.e.,f = 0, g > 0) helps to illuminate certain aspects of the
 model. One might suspect that the specialist would be at such an
 enormous disadvantage relative to the trader in this case that he
 would stay at his autarky position rather than trade at all. When = 0,
 the specialist's surplus is [x2/4(h + g)] - (h + g)V - gh- 1. It follows
 immediately from this equation that any positive value of V makes the
 specialist worse off than when V = 0. This result is actually quite
 plausible; noise interferes only with the specialist's ability to set the
 optimal price and cannot dilute the trader's information, because
 when f = 0 the trader ignores price as a source of information any-
 way. When V = 0, the specialist's surplus is [x214(h + g)] - ghI '. This
 surplus is clearly decreasing in g, so the specialist is indeed worse off
 the better the quality of information available to the trader. However,
 if g is small enough, in particular when g < (- h + Vh,2 ? 2, the
 specialist's surplus will be positive and he will prefer to trade despite
 his severe information disadvantage.
 This case illustrates the importance in this analysis of our assump-
 tion that the specialist is more risk tolerant than the trader. The
 trader's greater aversion to risk relative to the specialist means that
 the trader is willing to trade to get rid of some of his risky endowment
 even though the specialist sets the price of the risky asset below its
 expected value. This is analogous to the standard monopoly problem
 in which the seller gains by selling insurance at a monopoly price but
 loses because of inside information.
 When the trader has no information and the specialist does, that is,
 f> 0, g = 0, theorem 2 implies that the specialist's surplus reduces to
 2 f) _[f2 xt xf2if[4V(h + ?) 1] V - 4Vh(h f)]2
 4h 64V2hI2(h + f)3 ?4h + 4V(h + f)2] (8)
 Casual inspection of equation (8) suggests that for any f > 0, there
 exists some V in the interior of [fl4h(h + f), x) that maximizes the
 specialist's surplus (where we consider only that region over which an
 equilibrium exists, i.e., V > fl4h[h + ; see corollary 2). On closer
 inspection, however, we observe that no pair of f> 0 and V > fl4h(h
 + f) dominates f = 0 and V = 0! We state this as a corollary.
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 COROLLARY 4: Provided that the trader has no information, the
 specialist has no incentive either to become informed or to introduce
 noise, when his alternative is a level of information and noise in a
 region over which an equilibrium exists.
 PROOF: Under the restriction V > fl4h(h + f), the expression in
 equation (8) is (strictly) decreasing in f. Therefore, substituting the
 value V = fl4h(h + J) into equation (8) achieves an upper bound on
 the specialist's surplus: namely, zero. However, whenuf = 0 and V =
 0, the expression in equation (8) assumes the value 4/4h. Since this
 latter value is clearly higher, our claim is demonstrated. Q.E.D.
 The conditioning statement in corollary 4, namely, that the alterna-
 tive to f and V equal to zero is some level at which an equilibrium
 exists, is based on technical rather than economic considerations.
 There is no endogenous motivation in the model for the specialist to
 guarantee an equilibrium when the trader has no informational
 Corollary 4 is useful for contrasting the polar case of g = 0 with the
 more general case of g > 0. The intuition underlying corollary 4 is
 that the specialist has no particular need for private information
 other than to inform him about the trader's excess demand function:
 if the trader has no private information, his excess demand function
 is known to the specialist with certainty. When the trader has some
 private information, it is generally the case that it is optimal for the
 specialist to be informed as well. The specialist profits from acquiring
 private information since this information tells him something about
 the excess demand to be submitted to him on the basis of the price he
 quotes.
 It is also interesting to note from corollary 4 thatf = 0, g = 0, and V
 = 0 is the symmetric information case, and here the specialist's sur-
 plus is xt14h. Clearly, the specialist's surplus decreases as h, the preci-
 sion of the unknown liquidating value of the risky asset, increases.
 This suggests that as more information commonly known to the spe-
 cialist and trader is made available, the rent earned by the specialist
 drops. This may help to explain the substantial unexpected drop of
 the price of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange in March 1934,
 the month when the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was in-
 troduced into Congress. If the Act had the effect of increasing infor-
 mation to traders, the seat price drop would be a reflection of the loss
 "' As discussed in Sec. III, when a trader has no information and attempts to use
 price as a source of information, the specialist's incentive is to choose an arbitrarily
 large price; however, it is not clear that this is economically meaningful in the absence
 of some constraint that ensures an equilibrium. If a regulatory authority prohibits the
 specialist from having private information (e.g., no "inside information"), then an
 equilibrium will exist and the specialist will choose V = 0, even if the trader has no
 information. In this context, the regulatory prohibition on the specialist's having infor-
 mation might be thought of as a means of eliminating speculative bubbles.
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 of specialist surplus. This point is more difficult to make in the more
 general expression that arises for the specialist's surplus in the diverse
 case (see theorem 2). Visual evidence of the seat price drop in March
 1934 can be found in Schwert (1977).
 With regard to an optimal level of noise V, we have shown so far
 that a specialist's surplus is maximized at V = 0 when either = 0 or g
 = 0. Therefore, in these cases, garbling does the specialist no good.
 For each fixed and positive pair of f and g, there generally exists a
 positive, finite level of noise V that maximizes the specialist's surplus."
 On the one hand, the specialist profits from noise since this masks his
 private information from the trader. On the other hand, beyond a
 certain threshold, too much noise interferes with the specialist's ability
 to optimize.
 V. Consideration of Assumptions
 In summarizing our analysis, we consider the realism of our model in
 relation to how a specialist is commonly thought to operate. The first
 question concerns whether specialists are monopolists. Clearly, there
 is no prohibition on one trader's exchanging shares of a risky asset
 with some other trader and thereby circumventing the specialist.
 However, in the presence of large transaction costs associated with
 one trader's searching out someone else with whom to exchange as-
 sets at a mutually agreeable price, the idea that the trader will deal
 exclusively with the specialist is not unreasonable. Although these
 search costs are only implied in our model, when they are explicitly
 considered, the specialist may have the latitude to act as a monopolist.
 The second question concerns the fact that price is not contingent
 on the quantity of shares exchanged. This has two implications: the
 specialist is put at some disadvantage in that he cannot use price as a
 barrier against a trader's private information, and the trader himself
 behaves as a pure price taker in that he believes his demand has no
 influence on price. With regard to the first implication, it is more
 reasonable to imagine that the specialist does make price contingent
 on the quantity traded. This would be a very simple mechanism to
 l l To show that there are situations in which the specialist prefers a positive, finite
 level of V, consider the case in which = g = h = 1. Here, we evaluate the specialist's
 surplus at V = 0, V = 2, and as V approaches infinity. When V = 0, the specialist's
 surplus is 0.0625x2 - 0.5. When V = 2, an equilibrium exists with a = 0.3823 and the
 specialist's surplus can be written as 0.1206x, - 4.2276. As V approaches infinity, a
 approaches 0.375, and the specialist's surplus approaches 0.125x2 - 2V - 1. It is a
 simple exercise to show that when x, > 8.01, the selection of V = 2 dominates either V
 zero or V infinite. Since there exists some finite, positive level of V (i.e., V = 2) that
 yields a higher surplus than either polar extreme, the optimal level of V (assuming the
 specialists can freely select it) must be finite and positive.
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 guard against traders with superior information (e.g., "inside infor-
 mation") exploiting their knowledge. To that extent, our model sug-
 gests a limiting case to the more general circumstance in which prices
 are influenced by demand.
 The second implication is, perhaps, more profound in that if trad-
 ers are aware that their demand affects price, then they will behave
 strategically and not competitively. This fundamentally changes our
 analysis in that our primary objective is to integrate the role of the
 specialist without departing significantly from the competitive behav-
 ior exhibited by traders in the presence of a Walrasian auctioneer. We
 also remark that the large information requirements necessary for
 traders to act strategically suggest that competitive behavior is a more
 realistic approximation of an actual market setting.
 The final question concerns whether specialists stay in business be-
 cause they have a comparative advantage at bearing risk. (Looked at
 somewhat differently, the question could be rephrased to ask whether
 it would evolve naturally that the specialist would be the most risk-
 tolerant individual within a community of traders.) In our model, the
 specialist's greater tolerance for risk vis-A-vis the trader is key because
 it permits the specialist to achieve a positive surplus even in the pres-
 ence of unfavorable information asymmetries. It can be argued, how-
 ever, that the positive surplus that results from increased risk toler-
 ance may proxy for the variety of institutional frictions (which we
 ignore) through which a specialist profits: transaction charges, a bid-
 ask spread, a price contingent on the quantity traded, etc. In other
 words, the specialist may indeed have no comparative advantage at
 bearing risk. However, the peripheral ways in which he earns rents by
 performing a specialist's tasks may cause him to behave as if he is
 more risk tolerant or at least ensure him a positive surplus even in the
 presence of better-informed traders.
 VI. Conclusion
 This paper is motivated by what we perceive to be a gap in the litera-
 ture on the determination of prices in rational expectations equilibria.
 Much of the research on rational expectations assumes the existence
 of a neoclassical Walrasian auctioneer who clears the market but is
 exogenous to the model. The Walrasian auctioneer assumption,
 though useful and powerful in many situations, is in a fundamental
 sense inconsistent with the spirit of rational expectations models, es-
 pecially when information is not symmetrically distributed among
 market participants.
 Our work yields a number of results of theoretical and empirical
 interest, the main points of which are summarized here.
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 i) Equilibria exist under a broad set of conditions but not under all
 conditions. In particular, when the trader has no information and the
 specialist does, there is no equilibrium unless the noise in the price
 system is sufficiently large. When noise is small, a trader who attempts
 to use price as a source of information puts so much weight on the
 information contained in the price that the specialist has incentive to
 raise the price without bound.
 ii) Assuming the trader has no information and that the specialist is
 forced to choose the level of noise sufficiently large to ensure an
 equilibrium, the specialist has no incentive either to acquire informa-
 tion or to introduce noise. Because the specialist is risk neutral, the
 only reason he is ever interested in acquiring information is to obtain
 a better estimate of the trader's demand function before setting price.
 When the trader has no information his demand function is perfectly
 predictable, so the specialist gains nothing from acquiring informa-
 tion. The optimal price is nonstochastic when the trader has no infor-
 mation, and it is only to the specialist's disadvantage to add noise.
 iii) Even when the specialist is at an extreme information disadvan-
 tage relative to the trader (i.e., when the specialist has no private
 information but the trader does), the specialist may still prefer trad-
 ing to autarky. This is because the specialist may be able to exploit the
 risk aversion of the trader sufficiently to offset the trader's informa-
 tion advantage.
 iv) If both the specialist and the trader possess private information,
 the specialist may gain by adding a finite amount of noise to his price
 quotation. In this situation, the noise added to the price garbles the
 information transferred to the trader while forcing the specialist to
 relinquish some control over the price at which trading takes place.
 Despite the restrictiveness of certain of our assumptions, we believe
 that our analysis has the advantage that it approaches the problem of
 modeling price formation from the correct methodological perspec-
 tive. Specifically, the specialist's private incentives, in conjunction with
 the rational expectations of traders, are considered in providing a
 rationale for the information content of prices.
 Appendix
 Proof of Lemma I
 The proof of lemma 1 is in three parts. First, we determine the trader's
 optimal response to the offering of a price p for the risky asset by computing
 his excess demand as a function of his conjecture about the price rule used by
 the specialist. Second, in part ii, we determine an expression for the exchange
 rate of the risky asset that maximizes the specialist's expected utility in antici-
 pation of the trader's optimal response, and the information the specialist
 observes. Finally, in part iii, we show how the requirement that the trader's
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 conjecture about the price rule be correct leads to the two expressions in
 lemma 1.
 i) Suppose that the trader conjectures that the price rule has the following
 linear form: P + 8= ay, + bx, + c + 6. This implies that the random
 variables (f, %, P + 6) have a trivariate normal distribution with mean (y(, yo,
 ay( + bx, + c) and covariance matrix:
 h -I h-I ah-l
 Yt h - 1 h-1 + g-a ah-l
 P + ah-l ah-lo a2(h-1 +f'-) + V
 Then the trader's optimal response to the quotation of a price p for the risky
 asset is an excess demand function of the form:
 EC1Yt'- t P(-) + 6 p] - p_
 R (xt, yt, p) = t A - -P x,,
 var[filyt = y, P( ) + 8 = p]
 where E[MiL1t y=, P(-) + 6 = p] and var[Mult, yt, PFe) + 6 =p] are the mean
 and variance of D conditional on observingvy Y ,t and P( ) + 8 6 p. The mean
 and variance can be expressed as
 E[fily, yt P( ) + 8 = p] =y) + gki(yt - y() + k2(p - ay) - bxt - c)
 and
 var[afIl, yt, P( ) + 6 p] = ki,
 where
 a2 + JV
 a(2(h + f + g) + f V(h + g)
 Ja
 a 2(h + f + g) + fV(h + g)
 ii) The specialist observes the realization A, y, and then selects an ex-
 change rate for the risky asset that maximizes his expected utility in anticipa-
 tion of the trader's optimal response. This is equivalent to choosing a p* that
 solves
 max EA(a - p - )[-R(xt, At, p + 6)]Iy, =K
 p
 The use of the calculus indicates that the first-order condition for a maximum
 is satisfied at p*, where
 P* = E (SaI = yE) + [R(xt, Yt, p + 6)I), y,]
 Ik-'(I - k2)
 provided that k2 < 1, thereby ensuring that the maximization problem is
 concave in p.
 iii) The requirement ken < 1 becomes a requirement for an equilibrium,
 since in its absence, that is, kit : 1, the specialist maximizes his expected utility
 by selecting p* infinite, independent of his private information. But if p* is
 always infinite, it does not depend on A, = y, since it is invariant to the informa-
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 tion observed by the specialist. Therefore, any conjecture the trader makes
 about price's being a linear function of the specialist's private information
 cannot be fulfilled in the absence of k2 < 1. Note further that
 E(fIjt, = y.) =Yyo + h fy Y)
 E [R(xt, yt, p + 6)ly, = yj]
 = k, '[y( + gkjE(Yj - y(lyj + k2(p - ayo - bx, - c) - pj - x,
 = ky i(yo + gkil h y f,( - y - k2(ayo + bxt + c) - (1 - k2)P} - Xt.
 This implies that p* reduces to
 2 1 - k2) 2( h + f ( )( + 1 -k2)Y -yo)
 kIxt k2(ayo + bx, + c)
 2(1 - k2) 2(1 - k2)
 However, for the trader's conjecture to be fulfilled, it must be that E(p* + 6)
 = E(ay, + bx, + c + 6) = ay() + bx, + c. This requirement reduces p* further
 to
 t * + f )( + gk I )(Y. Yo) kixt
 2 h f i- + 2-k2
 Therefore, an equilibrium is a triplet of constants:
 a 2 (h +)(1 + I - k2 b = 2 -k' c = (1- a)yo. (Al)
 However, kl and k2 are functions of a. Substituting in the expressions for ki
 and ke, a solution to equation (Al) requires that a be a real-valued root to the
 third-order polynomial equation
 (A2)
 [2a(h + f) -f][a2(h + f + g) - af + Vf(h + g)] -fg(Vf + a2) = 0.
 Furthermore, the requirement k2 < 1 is equivalent to
 a2(h + f + g) - af + Vf(h + g) > . (A3)
 Q.E.D.
 Proof to Theorem 2
 Theorem 2 is simply a computation of the difference between the specialist's
 expected utility at an equilibrium and the specialist's autarky point. First, note
 that P can be expressed as P = a(,, - yo) + yo + bx, + 8, and R(-) as R(x,, y,, p
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 + 6) = ki 'jgki(yt - yo) - bx1 - (1 - k2)[a(y, - yo) + 6]} - xt. Thus, the
 specialist's surplus is
 EV[E,2 - ([u - a(yy - oyo) -yo bxt - 6]{-R[xt, yt, a(y, - Yo)
 + yo + bxt + 8]Iy5 Ys)]
 = -bx2 - - yo) - a(y, - yo) - bxt - 6]
 * {gkl(yt - yo) - bxt - (1 - k)a(y, - yo) + y]}I75 = Ys)]
 = -x b(I + kj lb) + agh-1 + a(l - k2)k-lh- a k2)k- '(h 1 + f'1)
 - (1 - k2)k'V -gh-
 = -x~2b(I + kjlb) + a2(1 - k2)k-y-'(h + f') - (1 - k2)klj'V gh-1
 where the last equality follows from the relation for an equilibrium required
 in equation (A2). Substituting back in the expressions for k, and k2 (see the
 proof to lemma 1) yields the results. Q.E.D.
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